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Azi Lev-On, University of Pennsylvania
Alex Chavez, University of Michigan

Abstract

Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the
topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant
differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant
difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions
than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions. Most importantly, we find that
first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and
strongly predict their levels of investment.

1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an upsurge in both the theoretical and the experimental study of
trust. The traditional game-theoretic literature that examines one-shot Trust games predicts that nobody
will trust, since it is common knowledge that no rational player will reciprocate. This prediction has
been found to be false in a variety of experimental games (Camerer 2003), and many hypotheses have
been advanced to explain the unexpected levels of trust and reciprocation. The culprit here is not
rationality per se, but instead the common auxiliary hypothesis that players only care about their own
material payoffs. In this paper we shall focus on the role of communication and mutual expectations in
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establishing trust and reciprocity. We assume players are rational, in the minimal sense of maximizing
their expected utility, but drop the hypothesis that they only care about their material payoffs. In
particular, we show how communication among players, when accompanied by promising, leads them
to trust and reciprocate even in difficult circumstances.
There is by now a large body of research on the role of communication in fostering pro-social
behavior (Bicchieri 2002). This research has mainly focused on face-to-face communication among the
parties. Many interactions, however, are less direct. Internet communication, for example, has
substituted many other forms of communication, and not just in the realm of commercial exchanges.
We are especially interested in the possibility of trust and cooperation in computer-mediated
environments. Online, trust can ground cooperation in a variety of contexts, such as decentralized
multinational organizations and auction sites. Lacking trust, agents may be deterred from mutually
beneficial exchanges with unfamiliar and possibly anonymous others. Furthermore, the emerging
interest in deliberative democracy and the related use of computer-mediated communication among
‘community’ members requires a significant amount of trust, and the willingness to reciprocate the
cooperative efforts and the investment in time and energy of community members. Hence the
importance of understanding the mechanisms through which communication supports trust and
cooperation.

2. The Communication Effect as an Anomaly
A robust experimental finding in the study of social dilemmas is the positive effect of
communication on cooperation, which Bicchieri (2002, 2006) denotes as the ‘communication effect.’
John Ledyard (1995), in an extensive survey of the experimental literature on public goods, singles out
communication and the marginal per capita return as the two variables most conducive to cooperation.
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Likewise, David Sally (1995), in a meta-analysis of 35 years of social dilemma experiments, shows that
the ability to communicate increases cooperation over base rates by 40%.
The communication effect has been mostly studied in face-to-face (FtF) settings. However,
there is a growing body of research that looks at the influence of other forms of communication in
social dilemma games, most notably computer-mediated communication (CMC). Bicchieri and Lev-On
(2007) provide a summary of the main findings about the computer-mediated communication effect in
Social dilemma experiments:

1. The communication effect is still present in computer-mediated environments: CMC produces higher
cooperation rates than equivalent environments in which communication is not allowed.
2. The communication effect varies in degree according to the richness of the communication channel.
Videoconferencing produces cooperation rates very close to FtF communication, whereas text-based
communication produces substantially less cooperation. Generally, the CMC effect approximates the
FtF communication effect the closer the communication channel comes to reproducing the features of
face-to-face communication.
3. Compared to FtF communication, it takes more time to establish cooperation, especially when using
‘poorer’ CMC channels. As in FtF communication, cooperation deteriorates over time in the absence of
continuing communication. After communication resumes, cooperation rates improve again.
4. Especially with asynchronous communication, it is more difficult to establish ‘social contracts’ in
CMC, and even when such agreements are reached, they are violated more frequently than agreements
reached using FtF communication.
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3. The Focus Theory of Norms
Such findings stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of traditional rational choice models,
according to which the strategic structure of social dilemmas and trust games should be resilient to the
influence of communication. Behaviors such as cooperation, trust and reciprocity should remain off the
equilibrium path following communication. In Social Dilemma and Trust games all talk should be
considered cheap, and communication is empty at best and deceptive at worst. A fortiori, the choice of
a communication medium should not influence behavior in such games: if no ‘communication effect’ is
expected, then the communication medium would obviously be inconsequential for cooperation, trust
and reciprocity.
However, since the 'communication effect' is a robust phenomenon in experimental games, it is
important to understand what makes communication so effective in promoting pro-social behavior.
Bicchieri (2006) has argued that, when communication is successful in supporting cooperation, this
happens because it focuses individuals on social norms, such as promise-keeping or reciprocity. Social
norms are not universal, generic rules insensitive to context; rather, they are sensitive to the particular
situation faced by the decision-maker. Norms should be understood in terms of expectations and
conditional preferences, and are susceptible to threshold effects. The very existence and motivational
force of a social norm depend upon there being a sufficiently large number of people who believe that it
exists and pertains to a given type of situation, and prefer to conform to it as long as:
(a) They expect that enough others follow the norm in similar contexts [empirical expectations], and
(b) They believe that enough others believe that they ought to conform to the norm as well [normative
expectations], and may even sanction transgressions [normative expectations with sanctions] (Bicchieri,
2006, p. 16).
According to this theory, when a social norm becomes situationally salient, it causes a shift in
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the individual’s focus, provides the individual with the right kind of expectations, and thus directs her
actions towards norm compliance. Focusing people on a social norm means that they know that the
situation is one to which the norm applies, expect a sufficiently large number of people to obey the
norm, and also believe that they are expected to conform to the norm by a sizable number of other
individuals, who may even be prepared to sanction violations. 1 Face-to-face (FtF) communication with
other agents involved in a social dilemma is a very effective mechanism to focus agents on pro-social
norms (Bicchieri 2002). In particular, since successful communication always involves an exchange of
promises, exchanging promises places agents in a familiar context associated with daily experiences
where people who make promises tend to keep them. In such contexts, promises are not perceived as
cheap talk, but have a clear binding force. Promises in dilemma settings focus agents on the norm of
promise-keeping, even if the norm is not backed by an enforcement mechanism. Promises to cooperate
are typically communicated through verbal utterances, and are supported by contextual cues such as
tone of voice, gestures, eye contact and so on. When promises are perceived to be credible, they support
judgments about the trustworthiness of others, and consequently elicit pro-social behavior.

4. Why Communication Relevance Matters
In this paper we report our experimental results about two dimensions of the communication
effect in Trust games: one is the influence of communication relevance (i.e., the situational relevance of
what is communicated), the other is the influence of the richness of the communication medium. There
are good reasons to expect that both communication relevance and richness of the medium would affect
trust and reciprocation in Trust games.
Let us start with the hypothesized importance of relevant communication, by which we mean
1

See Bicchieri 2006, p.98.

6
the possibility to talk about the strategic situation that the experimental subjects are facing, and their
ability to make non-binding pledges about future actions. As argued in Bicchieri (2202, 2006),
'relevant communication' will usually produce more trust and cooperation than 'irrelevant
communication', and when discussion lacks explicit promising, we may expect it to lose its
effectiveness in supporting trust. Failing to establish the normative environment required for informed
decisions about trust and reciprocity, risk-averse agents may fail to behave in a pro-social way.
Experimental work, mostly done with Social dilemma games, largely supports such hypotheses. Most
notably, Bouas and Komorita (1996) enabled participants to interactively communicate in a Social
dilemma game. While in one treatment subjects were allowed to talk about any topic, including the
dilemma, in the other treatment they were explicitly forbidden to discuss the dilemma (and, by
implication, to make promises about future actions) and were only permitted to discuss tuition levels.2
When participants were allowed to discuss the dilemma and thus make promises, the cooperation rate
was 81%. By contrast, when they were allowed to communicate but not discuss the dilemma, the
cooperation rate was only 17%. Similar results were obtained in an earlier study by Dawes, McTavish
and Shaklee (1977), in which the only permitted conversation topic was the percentage of people at
different income levels in Eugene, Oregon, and also by Gächter and Fehr (1999), who let participants
engage in 'personal conversations' about their studies and hobbies. In both studies, cooperation rates
were very low.
There are a few exceptions, though. In another experiment, high trust rates were recorded even
when subjects were involved in conversation irrelevant to the game, especially when the topics of
conversation were ‘personal’. Buchan, Croson and Johnson (2006) report that in a Trust game with a

2
Note that tuition levels were a relevant issue for the participants, who were all university students. It was,
however, irrelevant to the social dilemma they were facing. Bouas and Komorita (1996) interpret ‘relevant’ in a less
stringent sense than we do, since for them a relevant conversation may not be related to the experimental game.
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‘personal’ irrelevant communication condition (subjects introduced themselves and talked about
birthdays), and an ‘impersonal’ irrelevant communication condition (subjects answered questions from
the world almanac), trust in the first condition was significantly higher than in the second condition.
The experiment, however, did not include a control no-communication condition. The authors
hypothesize that even non-strategic communication can make a difference, but only if is 'personal'.
They claim that “personal communication prompts greater ‘other-regardingness’ than does impersonal
communication. The mere act of communicating more about themselves on a personal topic prompted
participants to be significantly more concerned with others” (Buchan, Croson and Johnson 2006, p.
392).
Such conjectures are to some extent supported by other experimental work by Rocco (1998),
where participants had a 45 minute social activity prior to playing a Social dilemma game. But recall
that Gächter and Fehr (1999) found no increase in cooperation following a 'personal' communication
prior to a Social dilemma game. Such mixed findings make the study of 'the kinds of non-strategic
communication that make a difference' an even more critical pursuit.

5. Why Media Richness Matters
A second factor that may influence the degree and characteristics of the 'communication effect'
is the richness of the communication medium. Richness may matter because it affects the background
conditions under which the act of promising occurs. As argued before, such conditions are crucial in
conveying the credibility of mutual intentions.
When promises are made in face-to face contexts, a variety of cues allow subjects to assess
intentions and form expectations about each other, all of which can make their mutual promises
credible. Such indicators include visual cues (i.e. body language, eye contact, facial expressions, etc.),
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verbal cues (tone of voice, phrasing, fluency, manner of expressing moral rhetoric, etc.) and social cues
(status, group membership, gender, etc). Such cues are frequently correlated by agents with
trustworthiness, and their presence or absence can have important motivational consequences via the
formation (or impairment) of mutual expectations of promise-keeping behavior. When a norm of
promise-keeping is activated, mutual expectations, beliefs and a conditional preference for following
the norm will also be simultaneously activated in the vast majority of participants (Bicchieri 2006).
However, when the environment and the means of communicating promises differ significantly from
familiar settings in which promises are usually made, agents may become focused on the ‘poverty’ of
the normative environment, fail to develop expectations about the future actions of promise-makers,
and as a result they may refuse to cooperate or trust.
There are relatively few social dilemma experiments that study the effects of communication in
computer-mediated contexts. When social dilemma experiments allow for unrestricted computermediated communication, including promising, cooperation rates are significantly higher than in a
control no-communication condition, although typically lower than in a face-to-face control condition
(see Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann, 2003; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998; Bos et al., 2001; Rocco,
1998; Zheng et al., 2002).
It seems that, though promising matters, it also matters how the promises are communicated.
Indeed, when the means of communicating promises are restricted, cooperation rates typically falter.
For example, when non-binding promises were generated through a computerized text message or were
written on a piece of paper (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Chen and Komorita, 1994), cooperation rates
did not differ significantly from the no-communication condition.
For example, in a ten-round Public-good game, Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) found no
significant differences in cooperation rates between a no-communication control condition and a
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‘numerical cheap talk’ (NCT) condition where subjects could anonymously send via computer a nonbinding message about how much money they intended to contribute before each period. To tease apart
the effects of promising from those of interactive communication 3, in a follow-up paper Bochet and
Putterman (2007) added another condition (similar to NCT) in which anonymous participants, before
making a contribution, could make a non-binding statement explicitly formulated as a promise after the
initial round of cheap talk. 4 Again, there were no significant differences in actual contributions between
the ‘numerical cheap talk with promising’ (NCTwP) condition and the no-communication condition.
These experimental data suggest that the further removed the act of promising is from daily contexts
where promises are made, the less it can promote cooperation (or trust). It is realistic to assume that
participants did not perceive others’ promises as credible, and may have even been aware that their own
promises might have been regarded with skepticism by the other parties. In this case, both empirical
and normative expectations falter, and it is not surprising that one should not feel bound by a norm of
promise-keeping that almost no one expects (or believe is expected) to follow.

6. What Kind of Promise?
In this paper we further explore the act of promise- making to clarify why and how it is
conducive to trust. We focus specifically on computer-generated promises to further understand if and
when pro-social behavior survives in computer-mediated environments.
Our paper gives two main contributions to the literature on communication and promising in
mixed-motive games in computer-mediated settings. First, the effects of irrelevant communication
3
Interactive communication involves messages sent from 1st mover to 2nd mover and vice versa. Non-interactive
communication means that only one side can send messages to the other; for example, in some experiments only
second-movers could send messages to first-movers, but first-movers could not respond.
4
Subjects were asked to choose one of the following statements: ‘I do not wish to make a promise at this time,’ or ‘I
promise to contribute ---- to the group account this period.’ If they chose the second option, they had to type an
integer between 0 and 10.
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have been mainly studied in face-to-face settings. We explore whether the differences between
strategy-relevant and irrelevant communication occur when communication is computer-mediated as
well.
Second, the communication effect has been studied almost exclusively in Social dilemma
games. Experimental work that directly tests the effects of interactive communication on behavior in
Trust games is just emerging. 5 Our paper thus makes a significant contribution to the study of a
'communication effect' – i.e., a positive and significant influence of communication on trusting and
reciprocating behavior- in Trust games as well.
Trust games are close cousins of Social dilemma games; in essence they are one-sided
sequential dilemmas. In a typical Trust game experiment, participants are assigned one of two roles:
first-mover or second-mover. Such games consist two decision periods. 6 In the first decision period,
each first-mover receives an endowment and then decides to send some, all, or none of it to the secondmover. The amount the first-mover does not send is hers to keep. In the second decision period, the
amount first-movers sent to second-movers is multiplied (by a given factor) by the experimenter. Then,
the second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the first-mover. The amount the
second-mover does not send is hers to keep. The original amount given to first movers as well as the
multiplication factor are common knowledge among the players.
A few studies demonstrate that the communication effect exists in Trust games as well. Among
them, the only study we know of that allowed interactive communication is by Ben-Ner and Putterman
5
Bohnet and Baytelman (2007) conducted surveys in which senior executives were asked about their choices in
simulated Trust games. Treatments included an anonymous one-shot Trust game scenario without communication,
and a one-shot Trust game scenario with face-to-face communication before making a decision. The authors found
significant differences between the communication and no-communication conditions in terms of amounts sent and
received, and the expectations of both first- and second-movers. They also found that after face-to-face
communication second-movers returned greater portions of the amounts sent to them by first-movers. The survey,
however, did not include CMC treatments, and did not involve monetary incentives to subjects.
6
By contrast, in one-shot social dilemma experiments there is only one decision period, and no role assignment to
the players.
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(2006). Their Trust games involved four relevant pre-play communication conditions: 1. nocommunication, 2. a one-stage computerized negotiation between first- and second-mover where
participants could make choices out of a table of possible distributions and could enter into a contract;
3. a three-stage computerized negotiation along similar lines; and 4. a computerized pre-play chat. The
authors found significant differences in terms of both trust and reciprocation between all
communication conditions and the no-communication condition, and in particular they found
significant differences between the non-binding chat and the negotiations conditions.
Other studies have allowed non-interactive communication prior to Trust games. For example,
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) allowed pre-play communication in the form of an unrestricted
written message from second-movers to first-movers. They found significant differences between the
communication and the no-communication conditions in terms of both trusting and reciprocating
behaviors. 7 However, when first-movers sent an unrestricted written message to second-movers, there
were no significant differences in trust or reciprocation between the communication and the nocommunication conditions.

7. Experimental Procedure
To further study the effects of communication (none, relevant and irrelevant) and medium
richness (face-to-face or computer-mediated) in Trust games, we designed the following experiment.

Methods
Participants. We recruited 64 participants using a web-based recruiting system at the University of
Pennsylvania. Participants earned an average of $18.40 (including a show-up payment of $5.00, SD =
7

Similar results were obtained by Ellingsen and Johannseeon 2004.
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$5.93).

Procedure. After seating participants, we distributed a set of written instructions and them read aloud
(see Appendix). Immediately prior to playing each game, participants also read instructions specific to
that game (see Appendix). After reading the instructions for each game, but prior to engaging in any
communication (see below), all participants were required to complete a computerized quiz to ensure
their understanding of the instructions. The instructions specified the following:
-

Each experimental session consisted of three Trust games. For each game, the firstmover had 6 USD, any dollar amount of which he or she could send to the secondmover. The amount second-mover received from the first-mover was tripled by the
experimenter. The second-mover could then send any dollar amount back to the firstmover.

-

Participants made all decisions anonymously via a computer interface.

-

Participants were paired randomly with a different partner for each game, and this
was common knowledge.

-

Prior to the first game, participants were not allowed to communicate, making it a
control condition.

-

Prior to the second game, pairs of participants communicated in real-time via
computer-based text chat for five minutes. Messages entered by each participant
appeared in a window visible only to the first- and second-movers comprising each
pair. In addition to using generic identifiers, we both verbally and in the written
instructions forbade participants from communicating their identities to their partners.
Following the communication period, participants made their decisions in the game
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privately, and had no further opportunities to communicate with their partner. Firstmovers did not receive feedback on the amount that the second-mover returned until
the end of the experimental sessions.
-

Prior to the third game, pairs of participants communicated face-to-face for two
minutes. Participants then returned to their computer stations made their decisions in
the game privately.

Furthermore, in roughly half of the experimental sessions, the instructions specified that
participants were allowed to discuss any topic except those pertaining to their identities.
However, in the remaining sessions, the instructions required instead that participants discussed
only the following questions (adapted from Buchan, Croson, and Johnson, 2006) which were not
relevant to the game: What are the three most populated cities in the world? What are the three
most populated cities in the US? How many people live in Philadelphia and the surrounding
suburbs? How many counties are there in Pennsylvania? The instructions explicitly stated that
there was to be no discussion about what choices that one might make, what the participant
thought was the best approach to the experiment, what the participant expected the other to do, or
what the participant earned in earlier games. In addition, the experiments monitored all
conversations to ensure adherence to the communication topics. Because we expected
participants to discuss topics relevant to the game in the first condition and to discuss topic not
relevant to the game in the second condition, we labeled these respectively as relevant and
irrelevant communication conditions.
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After making their decision, first-movers were asked about their expectations of secondmovers reciprocation. We wanted to know whether expectations differ depending on the
communication medium and condition, and if expectations predict the level of trust.

Design. We analyzed the effects of communication relevance and communication medium on three
dependent variables: 1) trust – the amount in dollars sent by the first-mover ($0 through $6); 2)
reciprocity – the amount returned by the second-mover, relative to the amount sent; and 3) expected
reciprocity – the amount the first-mover expected to be returned by the second-mover, relative to the
amount sent. Communication relevance was varied across participants, whereas medium (control,
computer-mediated, or face-to-face) was varied within participants. This design led to five
experimental conditions, No-communication (Control), CMC-Relevant, CMC-Irrelevant, FtF-Relevant,
and FtF-Irrelevant. To analyze the effects of communication relevance and medium in a regression
framework, we coded the conditions using three dichotomous variables: control (1 or 0), relevant
communication (1 or 0), CMC (1 or 0). The ordering of media was fixed (computer-mediated in the
second game, and face-to-face in the third); however, we did not anticipate an ordering effect as
pairings for each game were unique and information following each game was minimal.

Statistical Analysis. We modeled the three dependent variables as binomial responses using the
generalized linear model (GLM) framework. 8 Using a binomial GLM instead of ordinary least squares
was appropriate for two reasons: 1) the distributions of all three dependent variables were non-normal,
and 2) the amount returned by the second-mover should only be interpreted relative to the amount sent
(and therefore would need to be converted to a proportion of thrice the amount sent). The binomial
8

Some regressions revealed evidence of overdispersion, making a quasi-binomial model necessary.
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model allowed us to estimate the probability that the second-mover would return each dollar he or she
had available, even though the amount available depended on the first-mover’s decision. Finally, to
assess the main effects and the interaction of communication relevance and medium, we sequentially
tested pairs of nested models using likelihood ratio tests based on the F-statistic, where appropriate.

8. Results
Overview. Because gender did not significantly predict trust (F(1,110) = 0.45, p = .50),
reciprocity (F(1,88) = 1.03, p = .31), or expected reciprocity (F(1,88) = 0.56, p = .46), we did not
further analyze this variable.
Table 1 summarizes the responses across the five combinations of communication relevance and
medium. Both relevance and medium had large, positive effects on trust, reciprocity, and expected
reciprocity relative to the control condition. Relevant, face-to-face communication had the largest
effects on all three variables, whereas relevant, computer mediated communication had the second
largest effects. In addition to main effects of relevance and medium, there appeared to be interactions,
which we tested for and reported on below, in the subsections corresponding to each dependent
variable.
Figure 1Error! Reference source not found. shows the distributions of the amount received
and returned by the second-mover for all pairs of participants across conditions. Slightly fewer than
half of second-movers received the maximum amount possible (indicated by the large block of the
tallest light gray on the right side of the plot), corresponding to interactions in which the first-movers
sent their entire endowment of 6 USD (which was tripled and became 18 USD). In these interactions,
second-movers responded in a clear, bi-modal pattern: roughly two-thirds sent back exactly half (9
USD), and the remaining one-third sent nothing back. When first-movers sent less than their entire
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endowment, second-movers tended to send back little.
Table 1
Mean (SEM) of Trust, Reciprocity, and First-Mover Expectations by Communication Relevance
and Medium (N = 64)

Note. FtF = face-to-face; CMC = computer-mediated communication.
Control

FtF-Relevant CMC-Releva FtF-Irrelevant CMC-Irrelevant

(N = 32)

(N = 14)

Trust

2.63 (0.36)

5.57 (0.46)

5.14 (0.57) 4.17 (0.49)

3.28 (0.61)

Reciprocity

1.92 (.48)

7.57 (0.96)

5.14 (1.33) 3.33 (1.05)

1.94 (0.78)

Expected Reciprocity

3.54 (0.53)

8.36 (0.69)

7.43 (0.96) 5.56 (0.91)

4.28 (0.93)

(N = 14)

(N = 18)

(N = 18)

18
16
14
A
m
ou
nt
($)

Received
Returned

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Pairs

Figure 1. The amounts received and returned by the second-mover in each pair, sorted first by the
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amount received and then by the amount returned.

Communication. We should briefly mention the qualitative findings from the logs of CMC and faceto-face relevant communication conditions. Especially in face-to-face conditions, when participants
could discuss the game they always made promises. A typical exchange would be like the following:
[tr1]: Hey, how much are you gonna send? [tr6]: I’ll send $3 if you promise to return $4. [tr1]: Okay,

I’ll give you $4 if you send me $3.
These results are in line with what has been observed about face-to-face communication in
Social dilemma games: participants make promises and tend to keep them. Thus trustors tend to offer
what they promised, and trustees consistently reciprocate much more than in the control condition.

Trust. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 2 shows the distribution of trust across the five
conditions. First-movers were most trusting in the relevant communication conditions, in which the
majority sent their entire endowment of 6 USD. We conducted a simultaneous regression of trust on
control, communication relevance, and medium. F-tests revealed significant effects of control (F(1,93)
= 4.47, p = .037) and relevance (F(1,93) = 8.54, p = .004), but not of medium (F(1,93) = 1.56, p = .22).
Moreover, there was no interaction between communication medium and relevance (F(1,92) = 0.01, p =
.92). Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the model on the log-odds scale. Controlling for the
other variables, first-movers had over five times greater odds of sending each dollar when
communication was relevant. Relative to the other conditions, participants had three times lowers odds
of sending each dollar in the control condition.
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Figure 2. Distribution of trust by communication medium and relevance.

Table 2
Estimated Log-odds of Factors Predicting Trust (N = 64)
Variable

Estimate

SE

z

Intercept

-0.25

0.30

-0.83

Control

-1.09

0.51

-2.14*

Relevant

1.66

0.60

2.76**

CMC

-0.67

0.52

-1.28

Note. Residual deviance: 430.00 on 92 degrees of freedom. Estimated dispersion: 4.34.
*

p < . 05, **p < .01

Reciprocity. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 3 shows the distribution of reciprocity by
communication medium and communication relevance. As noted in earlier discussion, the pattern of
second-mover returns was highly bi-modal, with participants returning either nothing or exactly half of
the maximum (i.e., returning 9 of 18 USD). This pattern depended on the condition – for example,
almost all participants in the FtF-Relevant condition returned 9 USD, whereas almost all participants in
the control conditions returned nothing. Although this pattern was due in part to the different levels of
trust across conditions, a comparison of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that second-movers behaved
qualitatively differently across conditions, even after accounting for first-movers’ levels of trust.

19
Finally, for 19 data points, the amount trusted was zero; because reciprocity necessarily was zero for
these data, we omitted them from the analyses in this section.
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Figure 3. Distribution of reciprocity by communication medium and relevance.

We conducted a simultaneous regression of reciprocity on trust, control, communication
relevance, and medium. F-tests revealed significant effects of trust (F(1,73) = 28.49, p < .0001),
communication relevance (F(1,73) = 9.21, p = .002), and medium (F(1,73) = 8.02, p = .005), but not of
control. Moreover, controlling for trust, communication relevance, and medium, there was a significant
interaction between medium and trust (F(1,73) = 6.84, p = .009). Table 3 shows the estimated
coefficients of the interaction model on the log-odds scale. Reciprocity was higher in the CMC
condition for lower amounts of trust, but became higher in the FtF condition for higher amounts of
trust. For example, as the amount that the first-mover sent approached zero, the odds that the secondmover returned each available dollar was over seven times higher in CMC than in FtF. With each
additional dollar that the first-mover sent, however, the odds that the second-mover reciprocated
increased more rapidly for FtF interactions. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 4 shows these
predictions graphically: The probability of returning each available dollar increased with the amount
trusted, but increased more rapidly for the FtF and control conditions than for CMC.
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Table 3
Estimated Log-odds of Factors Predicting Reciprocity (N = 64)
Variable

Estimate

SE

z

Intercept

-4.04

0.61

-7.42****

Relevant communication

0.60

0.15

4.43****

Trust

0.54

0.11

5.36****

Computer-mediated chat (CMC)

2.03

0.90

2.25*

Trust x CMC

-0.42

0.16

-2.67**

Note. The residual deviance is 311.32 on 72 degrees of freedom. We did not find evidence of
overdispersion as the data are sparse.
*

p < .05, **p < .01, ****p < .0001.
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Figure 4 . Predicted reciprocity by level of trust.
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Expectations. To determine whether expected reciprocity predicted the first-mover’s level of trust, we
converted expected reciprocity into the expected percentage reciprocity (the amount expected to be
returned divided by the amount available), and then regressed trust on this variable using ordinary least
squares. 9 This conversion was necessary to control for the dependency of the maximum amount that
could be returned on the amount sent. The estimated coefficients in Table 4 show that trust increases
with the expected percentage reciprocity. When the first-mover expected nothing to be returned, the
predicted amount sent was only .36 dollars. For each percent of the amount sent that the first-mover
expected to be returned, however, the first-mover sent an additional .10 dollars. Thus, the median
expected reciprocity (proportion) of .5 resulted in a $5.5 increase in the amount returned. Moreover,
the R2 value of 0.78 indicates that a large percentage of the variance in trust is explained by the
expected percentage reciprocity.

Table 4
Estimates for Expected Reciprocity (Proportion) as a Predictor of Trust (N = 64)
Variable

Estimate

SE

T

Intercept

0.37

0.22

1.69

0.55

18.284****

Expected Percentage Recipr 10.08
Note. R2 = 0.78.
****

p < .0001

9
Model diagnostics identified two observations as high leverage outliers, which we excluded from the analysis.
Specifically, half-normal plots of the jackknife residual errors and Cooks’ distance revealed extreme values for these
points. Additionally, residual errors were over three standard deviations from the mean for these observations.
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We also examined the relationship between expected reciprocity and actual reciprocity, and
found that the amount the first-mover expected to be returned predicted reciprocity better than trust
itself did (F(1,88) = 0.13, p = 0.72). Table 5 shows the model estimates for expected reciprocity as a
predictor of reciprocation. Figure 5 illustrates how the odds that the second-mover would return each
dollar increased with the amount the first-mover expected to be returned.

Table 5
Estimated Log-odds of Expected Reciprocity as a Predictor of Reciprocity (N = 64)
Variable

Estimate

SE

z-value

Intercept

-2.86

0.56

-5.10****

Expected Reciprocity

0.25

0.07

3.79****

Note. Residual deviance: 327.10 on 75 degrees of freedom. Estimated dispersion: 3.27.
****

p < .0001
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Figure 5. Predicted reciprocation as a function of expected reciprocity, based on the model estimates in

9. Discussion and Conclusions
Our results suggest that, in Trust games, the behavior of first-movers is strongly
determined by their expectations of second-movers' reciprocation. Note, however, that those
expectations are rarely met, as expected reciprocation was significantly higher than the actual
reciprocation, across all conditions.
We also found that the variable most conducive to creating such expectations is -- paraphrasing
McLuhan (McLuhan and Fiore 1967) -- not the medium, but rather the message. In other words, firstmovers' investments were significantly higher following unrestricted communication than restricted or
no communication. Recall that unrestricted communication could include strategic discussion of the
game and promise-making; according to our transcripts, all subjects who participated in the unrestricted
communication were involved in both.
Media richness, instead, had no effect on trust. There were no significant differences between
the amounts sent following chat communication, face-to-face communication, and the nocommunication control when communication was restricted. Controlling for type of communication,
the medium had no significant effect on trust. By contrast, earlier experimental results that were
previously discussed found significant differences in cooperation rates across media types (FtF vs. chat
rooms or newsgroups). We believe this may have been due to the fact that those experiments allowed
unrestricted communication (and thus promise-making, etc.) between subjects. As we already
mentioned, we are the first to study the results of irrelevant (restricted) communication in Trust games,
across media conditions. Our results are, however, in line with the experiments that allowed nonstrategic-impersonal pre-play communication prior to Social dilemma games (Bouas and Komorita,
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1996 and Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 1977).
Another possible explanation of the discrepancy between our and others’ results is the presence
of 'learning effects'. Since computer-mediated communication deeply penetrates the fabric of everyday
lives, especially the lives of students who were the subjects in our experiments, it is possible that they
got accustomed to computer-mediated communication and, furthermore, found ways to overcome
media poverty by using symbols, special acronyms etc. that frequently appear in our transcripts. It may
turn out that, as years go by and users get more experienced in computer-mediated conversations,
computer-mediated communication will yield results similar to face-to-face communication, especially
in experiments like ours that allow extended conversations between exchange partners, not just short
numerical messages or one-line text messages. Though experiments that use numerical messages or
one-line text messages permit more control over the influence of communication on trust and
reciprocity, they move further away from everyday life conditions where people communicate with
each other via computer interfaces. This, in turn, jeopardizes the external validity of experiments that
involve such limited forms of communication.
As time goes by and computer-mediated communication becomes an important part of our lives,
we would expect people to become better able to use it proficiently and to form expectations about
future behaviors of exchange partners, at least when the content of communication is relevant to the
situations they face.
While trust did not differ significantly by communication medium, reciprocity did. Indeed,
reciprocity increased with the amount sent by the first-mover, and this effect was more pronounced in
face-to-face communication. This result is consistent with earlier findings that individuals engage in
positive reciprocation, especially following communication. It should also be noted that first-movers
received no dividend on their investment in second-movers -- with the exception of the face-to-face
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condition. This supports our hypothesis that communication, when accompanied by promising, focuses
participants on social norms (in this case, promise-keeping and reciprocity), and motivates them to trust
more and reciprocate. Interestingly, we find that first-movers seem to over-estimate the willingness of
second-movers to send money back. This, again, might be due, when relevant communication is
allowed, to the expectation that second-movers will abide by the social norms activated by
communication about the game.
Our results have some institutional implications as well. Many online exchange sites allow
some form of communication between future exchange partners. But these forms of communication
vary widely; some allow individuals to send just a short numerical statement to each other or even just
check a box (which is, of course, also a minimal form of communication). Others allow unlimited
communication in terms of content, length etc. It is likely that the closer the sites come to the latter
type of communication, the more conducive they will be to the trusting which is needed to trigger
mutually-beneficial exchanges. On the other hand, when sites do not allow subjects to convey to each
other much information relevant to their future exchanges, they may disable the formation of empirical
and normative expectations, and thus jeopardize the success of computer-mediated exchanges.
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Appendix

General Instructions
This is an experiment about interpersonal decision-making. Specifically, it is concerned with how pairs
of people make decisions that affect one another.
You have already earned $5 for coming in today, and can earn an additional amount of money (in the
range of $0-37). The amount of money you make depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the
persons with whom you are paired. You will be involved in three short and consecutive experiments.
Because you will not be paired with the same person twice, the three experiments are independent of
each other
Immediately following the three experiments you will be paid your earnings in cash, in a sealed
envelope. You will receive your total earnings for two of these experiments that will be randomly
chosen. Since nobody knows in advance which experiments you will be paid for, each experiment has
the potential to affect your earnings.
Unless otherwise specified, the decisions you make and the amount you earn are strictly anonymous. At
no point will the experimenters make available any information about your decisions or earnings to
other participants. Since you will be assigned a code ID, not even the experimenters will know your
choices.
Please focus your attention on your computer screen and your screen only, and remain silent. At this
time, please put away all reading materials, cell phones, headphones, and other electronic equipment.
Please do not check your email, use instant messaging, or browse the web at any time during this
experiment. Not following the instructions may disqualify you from further earnings.
You will be asked to enter a login ID. This will be handed out to you shortly.
For each experiment, you will read a set of instructions, followed by a short quiz to ensure that you
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understand them. In the case that you finish early with the quiz or experiment, please wait patiently
while others are still completing them. If you have any questions, raise your hand and an experimenter
will come by.

Experiment 1 (no-communication)

In this experiment people are assigned to one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. You will
be assigned to one of these roles, and will be paired with another person in this room. You will not be
able to tell who is the person you are paired with, either during or after the experiment, and likewise the
person you are paired with will not know who you are.
The experiment contains two decision periods.
(1) In the first decision period, each first-mover receives an endowment of $6 and then decides to send

some, all, or none of this amount to the second-mover. First-movers can only send a discrete amount
of dollars; that is, they can send $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, or $6. The amount the first-mover does not send
is hers/his to keep.
(2) In the second decision period, the amount first-movers sent to second-movers is tripled. Then, the

second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the first-mover. Second-movers can only
send a discrete number of dollars. The amount the second-mover does not send is hers/his to keep.
Thus, the first-mover’s payoff is the amount he/she keeps in the first decision period, plus the amount
the second-mover sends in the second decision period. The second mover’s payoff is the amount of
money received from the first-mover (multiplied by 3) that he/she chose to keep.
Example 1. The first-mover sends $1 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $3. If the second-mover sends all $3 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[8,0]: $8 for the first-mover ($5 he/she kept plus the $3 sent from the second-mover), and $0 for the
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second-mover. If instead the second-mover sends nothing to the first mover, then the final payoffs
would be [5,3]: $5 for the first-mover and $3 for the second-mover.
Example 2. The first-mover sends $6 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $18 ($6 x 3 = $18). If the second-mover sends all $18 to the first mover, then the final
payoffs would be [18,0]: $18 for the first-mover and nothing for the second-mover. If instead the
second-mover sends $9 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be [9,9]: $9 for the first-mover
and $9 for the second-mover.
The most money that the first-mover can send to the second-mover is his/her entire endowment of $6
(before it is multiplied). The second-mover can send back any amount between zero and the amount
sent by the first-mover (multiplied by 3)
First-movers and second-movers will never know each other’s identity.
Note that the decisions of second-movers are always anonymous. Since we pay only two out of three
experiments, first-movers will not know, even after the end of all three experiments, the total amount of
money sent back by any second-movers.
Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your seat and to
refrain from any form of communication with other participants. After you received a computerized
message informing you that you should make your selection, you will have 40 seconds to do so.

Experiment 2a (CMC Irrelevant communication)
In this experiment people are assigned to one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. You have
already been assigned to one of these roles in Experiment 1, and will keep this assignment. You will be
paired with another person in this room with whom you were not paired before. You will not be told
who is the person you are paired with, either during or after the experiment, and likewise the person
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you are paired with will not know who you are.
As in the previous experiment, each first-mover receives an endowment of $6 and then decides to send

some, all, or none of this amount to the second-mover. The amount first-movers sent to secondmovers is tripled. Then, the second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the firstmover. First- and second-movers can only send a discrete number of dollars. The amount the first- and
second-movers do not send is theirs to keep.
Example. The first-mover sends $3 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $9. If the second-mover sends $3 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[6,6]: $6 for the first-mover ($3 he/she kept plus the $3 sent from the second-mover), and $6 for the
second-mover. If instead the second-mover sends $5 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[8,4]: $8 for the first-mover and $4 for the second-mover.
Right after we finish reading the instructions, you will have the opportunity to participate in a
computerized text chat, and you can use your keyboard to send messages to the person you are
paired with. You may chat for up to five (5) minutes.
During the communication period, you may not discuss the decision you will make, including what you
think is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do, what you would like the other person
to do, or your decisions and earnings from earlier experiments.
You may discuss only one or more of the following topics:
What are the three most populated cities in the world? What are the three most populated cities in the
US? How many people live in Philadelphia and the surrounding suburbs? How many counties are there
in Pennsylvania?
To make sure that these rules are adhered to, your conversation will be monitored by a member of the
experiment team.
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You may not send a message that attempts to identify you to the person you are paired with. For
example, you may not use your real name, nicknames, or self-descriptions of any kind (“Tom Smith
here,” “I’m the guy in the red shirt sitting near the window,” “It’s me, Sandy, from French class,” or
even “As a woman [Latino, Asian-American, etc.], I think…”).
When the communication period ends, you must cease all communication. You will then separately and
individually make your decision. You will not have the opportunity to speak to the person you are
paired with for the remaining duration of the experiment.
First-movers and second-movers will never know each other’s identity. Note that the decisions of
second-movers are always anonymous. Since we pay only two out of three experiments, first-movers
will not know, even after the end of all three experiments, the total amount of money sent back by any
second-movers.
Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your seat and to
refrain from any form of communication with other participants. After you received a computerized
message informing you that you should make your selection, you will have 40 seconds to do so.
You will now be asked to take a short quiz to ensure your comprehension of the instructions.

Experiment 3a (FtF Irrelevant communication)
In this experiment people are assigned to one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. You have
already been assigned to one of these roles in Experiment 1, and will keep this assignment. You will be
paired with another person in this room with whom you were not paired before.
As in the previous experiment, each first-mover receives an endowment of $6 and then decides to send

some, all, or none of this amount to the second-mover. The amount first-movers sent to secondmovers is tripled. Then, the second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the first-
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mover. First- and second-movers can only send a discrete number of dollars. The amount the first- and
second-movers do not send is theirs to keep.
Example. The first-mover sends $4 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $12. If the second-mover sends $4 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[6,8]: $6 for the first-mover ($2 he/she kept plus the $4 sent from the second-mover), and $8 for the
second-mover. If instead the second-mover sends $5 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[7,7]: $7 for the first-mover and $7 for the second-mover.
Right after we finish reading the instructions, you will have an opportunity to talk face-to-face with the
person you are paired with. You may talk for up to two (2) minutes.
During the communication period, you may not discuss the decision you will make, including what you
think is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do, what you would like the other person
to do, or your decisions and earnings from earlier experiments.
You may discuss only one or more of the following topics:
What are the three most populated cities in the world? What are the three most populated cities in the
US? How many people live in Philadelphia and the surrounding suburbs? How many counties are there
in Pennsylvania?
To make sure that these rules are adhered to, your conversation will be monitored by a member of the
experiment team.
When the communication period ends, you must cease all communication. You will then return to your
computer terminal to separately and individually make your decision. You will not have the opportunity
to speak to the person you are paired with for the remaining duration of the experiment.
Note that the decisions of second-movers are always anonymous. Since we pay only two out of three
experiments, first-movers will not know, even after the end of all three experiments, the total amount of
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money sent back by any second-movers.
Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your seat and to
refrain from any form of communication with other participants. After you received a computerized
message informing you that you should make your selection, you will have 40 seconds to do so.
You will now be asked to take a short quiz to ensure your comprehension of the instructions.

Experiment 2b (CMC Relevant communication)
In this experiment people are assigned to one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. You have
already been assigned to one of these roles in Experiment 1, and will keep this assignment. You will be
paired with another person in this room with whom you were not paired before. You will not be told
who is the person you are paired with, either during or after the experiment, and likewise the person
you are paired with will not know who you are.
As in the previous experiment, each first-mover receives an endowment of $6 and then decides to send

some, all, or none of this amount to the second-mover. The amount first-movers sent to secondmovers is tripled. Then, the second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the firstmover. First- and second-movers can only send a discrete number of dollars. The amount the first- and
second-movers do not send is theirs to keep.
Example. The first-mover sends $3 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $9. If the second-mover sends $3 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[6,6]: $6 for the first-mover ($3 he/she kept plus the $3 sent from the second-mover), and $6 for the
second-mover. If instead the second-mover sends $5 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[8,4]: $8 for the first-mover and $4 for the second-mover.
Right after we finish reading the instructions, you will have the opportunity to participate in a
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computerized text chat, and you can use your keyboard to send messages to the person you are paired
with. You may chat for up to five (5) minutes. During the communication period, you may discuss
anything you like, including what you think is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do,
or what you would like others to do.
When the communication period ends, you must cease all communication. You will then separately and
individually make your decision. You will not have the opportunity to speak to the person you are
paired with for the remaining duration of the experiment.
There are two restrictions on the types of messages that you may send.
First, you may not send a message that attempts to identify you to the person you are paired with. For
example, you may not use your real name, nicknames, or self-descriptions of any kind (“Tom Smith
here,” “I’m the guy in the red shirt sitting near the window,” “It’s me, Sandy, from French class,” or
even “As a woman [Latino, Asian-American, etc.], I think…”).
Second, you may not discuss your decisions and earnings from earlier experiments. A member of
the experiment team will monitor the discussion, to insure that these rules are adhered to.
First-movers and second-movers will never know each other’s identity.
Note that the decisions of second-movers are always anonymous. Since we pay only two out of three
experiments, first-movers will not know, even after the end of all three experiments, the total amount of
money sent back by any second-movers.
Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your seat and to
refrain from any form of communication with other participants. After you receive a computerized
message informing you that you should make your selection, you will have 40 seconds to do so.
You will now be asked to take a short quiz to ensure your comprehension of the instructions.
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Experiment 3 b (FtF Relevant communication)
In this experiment people are assigned to one of two roles: first-movers and second-movers. You have
already been assigned to one of these roles in Experiment 1, and will keep this assignment. You will be
paired with another person in this room with whom you were not paired before.
As in the previous experiment, each first-mover receives an endowment of $6 and then decides to send

some, all, or none of this amount to the second-mover. The amount first-movers sent to secondmovers is tripled. Then, the second-mover can send some, all, or none of this amount to the firstmover. First- and second-movers can only send a discrete number of dollars. The amount the first- and
second-movers do not send is theirs to keep.
Example. The first-mover sends $4 to the second-mover. This amount is tripled, so that the secondmover receives $12. If the second-mover sends $4 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[6,8]: $6 for the first-mover ($2 he/she kept plus the $4 sent from the second-mover), and $8 for the
second-mover. If instead the second-mover sends $5 to the first mover, then the final payoffs would be
[7,7]: $7 for the first-mover and $7 for the second-mover.
Right after we finish reading the instructions, you will have an opportunity to talk face-to-face with the
person you are paired with. You may talk for up to two (2) minutes. During the communication period,
you may discuss anything you like, including what you think is the best approach to the experiment,
what you plan to do, or what you would like others to do. You may not discuss your decisions and

earnings from earlier experiments. A member of the experiment team will monitor the discussion, to
insure that this rule is adhered to.
When the communication period ends, you must cease all communication. You will then return to your
computer terminal to separately and individually make your decision. You will not have the opportunity
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to speak to the person you are paired with for the remaining duration of the experiment.
Note that the decisions of second-movers are always anonymous. Since we pay only two out of three
experiments, first-movers will not know, even after the end of all three experiments, the total amount of
money sent back by any second-movers.
Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your seat and to
refrain from any form of communication with other participants. After you received a computerized
message informing you that you should make your selection, you will have 40 seconds to do so.
You will now be asked to take a short quiz to ensure your comprehension of the instructions.

